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ABSTRACT: The impact of privatization on public service quality is an enduring issue 
in public policy and management. Advocates of privatization suggest that market forces 
prompt private firms to provide better quality services, while opponents point towards 
the potential for quality to be traded off against profits. Drawing on incomplete contract 
and capability theories, we explore a more nuanced possibility: that private providers of 
public services perform better on dimensions of public service quality that are easier to 
measure and monitor, and vice versa. Using panel data on service quality in prisons in 
England and Wales in the period 1998 to 2012, we find that privately-managed prisons 
do perform better on dimensions of quality, such as confinement conditions and 
prisoner activity, that are more easily measured, whereas public prisons perform better 
on dimensions of quality, such as levels of order and prisoner safety, that are less easily 
measured and managed. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Private provision of public services has long been part of the business of managing 
government efficiently and effectively. In the wake of the New Public Management 
(NPM) reforms that spread across the globe from the 1980s onwards though, there has 
been increasing interest in the private management and ownership of key public services 
at all levels of government (Kettl 2000; O’Toole and Meier 2004). A critical question 
for governments considering the privatization of public services is whether private firms 
provider better quality services than their public sector counterparts (Hodge 2000; 
Warner and Clifton 2014). In comparison with the performance of private sector 
organizations, the quality of the outputs provided by public services is notoriously 
difficult to measure and monitor (Walker et al. 2010). For these reasons, it is sometimes 
thought that private firms may not have the capabilities required to deal with all of the 
complexities of effectively managing public services.  
According to incomplete contract theories, in particular, privatization should be 
restricted to public services for which there are clear and transparent indicators of 
performance and for which it is straightforward to specify service quality standards 
within a contract (Hart et al. 1997). However, given that most public service 
organizations pursue multiple goals, some of which are easier to measure than others, 
few services may meet the easy-to-specify criteria in full. Hence, the quality of public 
and private service provision may vary considerably depending on the dimension of 
performance being measured. Moreover, since organizations from different sectors may 
bring distinctive sectoral advantages to service provision, sector-specific capabilities too 
may shape service quality. To evaluate whether sectoral differences in performance 
might be related to output measurability and to differential organizational capabilities 
within the public and private sectors, we systematically analyze multiple dimensions of 
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the quality of confinement in publicly and privately-managed prisons in England and 
Wales between 1998 and 2012. 
Prisons represent an especially relevant setting for investigating the relationship 
between privatization and service quality. Incomplete contract theorists regard the 
provision of prison services as a paradigmatic example of a public service for which it is 
likely to be difficult to specify quality standards (Hart et al. 1997). Moreover, the 
private management of prisons has become a hotly debated issue in many countries 
across the world, such as Australia, Brazil, Canada, France, the United Kingdom (UK) 
and the United States (US) (see Cabral and Saussier 2013; English 2013; Moore et al. 
2003). Some of these countries have a long history of privately-managed prisons of one 
sort or another stretching back into the 19th Century and beyond (Jones and Newburn 
2005). Even so, privatization as a tool of penal policy grew rapidly alongside the 
emergence of NPM during the 1970s and 1980s, primarily in an effort to contain fast 
growing service costs and to solve overcrowding issues (Schicor 1995). In the UK, the 
involvement of large corporations in the management of prisons was firmly established 
when the first prison run by the company Group 4 (now G4S) was opened in 1992 
(Boin et al. 2006). However, despite the apparent acknowledgement of the potential role 
the private sector can play in prison services, questions continue to be raised about the 
suitability of prisons as a candidate for contracting out (Price and Morris 2012).  
The conventional arguments made by advocates of privatization focus on the 
way in which the profit-incentive drives greater cost-consciousness, service orientation 
and “customer responsiveness” in business firms (Hodge 2000). At the same time, 
strategic management theorists increasingly emphasize the potential for private 
involvement in public services to generate ‘sustainable value’ by bringing public and 
private interests closer together (Mahoney et al. 2009). Both perspectives point toward 
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the notion that the private sector may possess distinctive capabilities that are much less 
evident in public organizations, especially the capacity to innovate by identifying and 
pursuing new opportunities for service provision, which, may, in turn generate positive 
sectoral spillover effects (Klein et al. 2010). Nonetheless, theories of comparative 
sectoral advantage highlight that public sector organizations too may have distinctive 
capabilities, especially the authority and experience required to address complex or 
‘wicked’ social issues (Selsky and Parker 2005).  
Notwithstanding arguments about private and public organizational capabilities, 
incomplete contract theorists warn that private contractors of public services may have 
an incentive to let service quality deteriorate in order to maximize profits. According to 
Hart et al. (1997) this is especially likely in prisons, because firms can save money by 
employing less qualified staff and driving supplier costs down, which in turn may 
adversely affect the quality of confinement experience for prisoners. Nevertheless, it is 
equally possible that service quality in public and private prisons may vary depending 
on the measurability of the performance dimension under consideration, and the 
organizational capabilities that are best-fitted to good performance. For example, private 
prisons may invest in better quality facilities and prisoner activities, especially if they 
are responsible for the construction and management of an institution (Hart 2003). In 
part, this reflects the fact that judgements about the quality of facilities and activities are 
more easily made than about the quality of prison order and safety. At the same time, 
there may well be more scope for the development of innovative ways of providing 
facilities and activities, than there is for managing levels of violence and disorder. By 
contrast, public prisons may perform better on measures of prison order and safety, 
because they employ prison officers who are more experienced in making judgements 
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about acceptable levels of violence or misconduct and have greater authority in dealing 
effectively with challenging prisoners (Hart et al. 1997).  
Are there incentives for private firms to allow service quality to deteriorate? 
Does the performance of private and public prisons vary across different dimensions of 
service quality? Might distinctive sectoral capabilities explain variations in 
performance? To answer these questions, we analyze service quality in publicly and 
privately-managed institutions in England and Wales for the period 1998-2012. In the 
next section, we explore the major theoretical arguments, which deal with the 
relationship between privatization and its potential effects on service quality, developing 
hypotheses about the relationships between ownership and service quality. Following 
that, we review the empirical evidence on the links between prison privatization and 
service quality. Thereafter, we describe our data and methods, before presenting and 
discussing the results of our statistical analysis.  The paper concludes with an 
assessment of the theoretical and practical implications of our findings.  
 
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PRIVATIZATION AND SERVICE 
QUALITY 
The demand for the privatization of public services has been heavily influenced by the 
public choice and property rights literatures, which emerged in the 1960s and 70s, and 
that shaped the development of NPM (Bel et al. 2010; Alonso et al. 2013). At the same 
time, the strategic management literature is now replete with recommendations for 
closer relationships between the public and private sectors, as it is arguably only 
through cross-sectoral collaboration that it will be possible to deal with the most 
pressing societal issues facing the world today (McGahan et al. 2013). All of these ideas 
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suggest that there is something intrinsically valuable to be gained from private 
involvement in public service provision. 
Both public choice and property rights theory claim that public provision of 
services is inherently more inefficient than private (see Downs 1967; Niskanen 1968; 
1971; Jackson 1982; Grossman and Hart 1986; Mueller 1989; Hart and Moor 1990; 
Vining and Boardman 1992; Miranda 1994; McMaster and Sawkins 1996), and that the 
efficiency advantage that private firms enjoy enables them to devote more time and 
energy to improving service quality. Public choice theory critiques government-
managed provision of public services because it assumes that politicians and 
bureaucrats will always behave in a self-interested way (Niskanen 1968). Drawing on 
neo-classical economics, the public choice perspective suggests that the typical public 
servant will seek to maximize his or her budget and personal interests and that this will 
mean neglecting the citizens they purportedly serve (Niskanen 1971). Politicians and 
bureaucrats have the opportunity and incentive to use their control over public service 
provision as a tool to maximize their own utility or political power. As a result, it is 
likely that publicly-managed services will be over-supplied and that efficiency will 
suffer (Savas 1987). Privatization, public choice theorists argue, is therefore an effective 
policy tool to avoid or minimize such behavior. By forcing previously protected in-
house activities into a new environment characterized by market discipline and 
competition amongst potential service providers, overall service delivery costs should 
be reduced, whilst the efficiency and quality of public service provision improved 
(Osborne and Gaebler 1992). 
The property rights theory approach, associated with the classical studies by 
Coase (1960), Demsezt (1967), Alchian and Demsetz (1972) and, more recently 
developed by Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moor (1990), also predicts that 
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the private sector will perform more efficiently than the public sector. Private firms 
enjoy higher incentives to innovate and cut costs because, unlike the public sector, 
innovations may generate tangible benefits to the people responsible for their 
implementation (Shleifer and Vishny 1994). Monetary incentives, in particular, are 
thought to promote efficiency. For instance, if a manager personally benefits from 
improved performance through the issue of company shares or salary improvements 
then there is good reason for them to actively seek out and realize efficiency gains 
(Andrews et al. 2011a).  
Strategic management scholars advocating greater cross-sectoral collaboration 
focus on the promise of value creation through complementarity in capabilities when 
private firms and public organizations are brought together to pursue the public interest 
(Argawal et al. 2009; Mahoney et al. 2009). From this perspective, private provision of 
public services is generally thought to have the advantage of merging the comparative 
strengths and capabilities distinctive to the private sector – innovation, financial 
capacity, knowledge of technologies, and entrepreneurial spirit - with the social 
responsibility, environmental awareness, and probity characteristic of the public sector. 
Hence, prison privatization may, where appropriately monitored by public agents, 
facilitate the development of new capabilities that are central to continuous 
improvements in service quality across the system (Cabral et al. 2013). 
Despite the popularity of the ideas advocating greater private involvement in 
public service provision, there are still many scholars who are skeptical about the 
potential for private management of public services to result in the kind of improved 
performance that its advocates assume. On the one hand, Davies (1971), for example, 
argues that, private property rights are simply not as strong when firms are involved in 
public service provision, calling into question the potential for financial incentives to 
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motivate service improvement. On the other hand, Williamson (1999) asserts that any 
attempt to incentivize the provision of public services runs the risk of harming probity 
(and by extension equity and quality) by encouraging autonomy at the expense of 
administrative control. More recently, skepticism about the consequences of 
privatization for service quality has largely drawn on the idea that private provision of 
public services would be plagued by incomplete contracts (Jensen and Stonecash 2005). 
In particular, the incomplete contracts model in Hart et al. (1997) suggests that profit 
maximization incentives may actually have a downward effect on service quality, 
particularly when quality is difficult to measure because this makes it much harder to 
fully specify and monitor contractual obligations.  
Hart et al. (1997) apply the theory of incomplete contracts to situations in which 
(a) the government can deliver a certain service in-house, such as prisoner confinement, 
or (b) the government can contract with a private firm for the service delivery. 
Assuming that contracts cannot specify ex-ante each and every quality aspect, Hart et al. 
(1997)  show that private firms may still have an incentive to simultaneously reduce 
costs and increase quality as the two dimensions of performance are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive. However, the incentive to cut costs may be so strong that firms 
ignore the adverse consequences on quality of cost reductions. According to Hart et al. 
(1997, 1128), “in the case of prisons, concern that private providers hire unqualified 
guards to save costs, thereby undermining safety and security of prisoners, is a key 
objection to privatization”.  
Hart et al. (1997) argue that incomplete contracts invariably give room to private 
contractors to reduce costs and quality – what is usually referred in the contracting 
literature as the “quality shading hypothesis” (Domberger and Jensen 1997). This 
problem may become even more severe if those drafting the contract (say politicians, 
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policymakers or public managers) make a mistake or have some kind of incentives to 
draft a contract favoring the private contractor (Hart et al. 1997, 1153; Lopez de Silanes 
et al. 1997, 449). On the face of it then, it seems likely that privatization will result in a 
deterioration of service quality in prisons, especially as contracts specifying quality 
standards are difficult to draft and enforce (Hefetz and Warner 2004). However, despite 
the challenges of measuring output quality in prisons (see Lundahl et al. 2009), it also 
conceivable that some dimensions of confinement quality may be more easily measured 
and monitored than others, and that where output measurability is higher, privately-
managed prisons outperform their publicly-managed counterparts.  
Johnston and Romzek (1999, 394) emphasize that contract management and 
performance accountability “do not take care of themselves”. Rather, government has to 
invest time and effort in ensuring both that contracts are well-specified and that 
arrangements are in place to ensure that it is possible to compare “quality and quantity 
of product or service delivered against contract specification” (Prager 1994, 179). The 
development of a suite of performance measures that can form the basis for gauging 
whether appropriate service standards are being met is therefore of great importance.  
However, public service outputs vary considerably in how easily they are measured 
(Andrews et al. 2011b), which makes it hard for government to tightly specify and 
monitor contract performance across the multiple dimensions of quality for any given 
service.  
Due to the variability in the measurability of public service outputs, private 
contractors may have an incentive to focus more attention on those quality dimensions 
where output measurability is higher simply because the management and monitoring 
costs associated with meeting the service standards for those dimensions may be lower. 
At the same time, more easily measured aspects of service quality may also be more 
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susceptible to the kinds of “quick wins” that the fresh approach and innovative 
capabilities of a private contractor can bring to the provision of public services, 
especially where technological innovations can be brought to bear. By contrast, for 
quality dimensions where output measurability is low, contractors (and government) 
may be less willing to invest the additional time and money required to monitor and 
manage contract performance to an optimum level. In these circumstances, the 
traditional virtues of public sector organizations, such as high-reliability, transparency 
and mandated authority, may be especially likely to come to the fore. Broadly speaking 
then, in this paper, we seek to test two complementary hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Private contractors will perform better on easy-to-measure dimensions of 
service quality compared to public providers 
Hypothesis 2: Private contractors will perform more poorly on difficult-to-measure 
dimensions of service quality compared to public providers 
 
EVIDENCE ON PRISON PRIVATIZATION AND SERVICE QUALITY 
Prisons represent an especially good context for evaluating the role that output 
measurability plays in shaping the privatization-service quality relationship. Penal 
institutions are not simply facilities for the incarceration of criminals, but are also sites 
for the humane treatment and potential rehabilitation of offenders (Morris and Rothman 
1998). Hence there are some dimensions of prison service quality, such as the number 
of escapes or the number of individuals held within each available cell that are 
comparatively easy to measure and monitor, but others, such as the number of violent 
incidents, that are much more difficult to capture accurately, and even more difficult to 
manage effectively. A review of the evidence on prison privatization and service quality 
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can therefore provide us with an indication of whether the hypotheses we advance are 
likely to be borne out in the case of English and Welsh prisons.  
The existing evidence on prison privatization and service quality can be 
categorized into three main types: case study approaches; meta-analyses of case studies; 
and, more recently, regression-based quantitative empirical studies. This literature, 
however, is not extensive, and is mainly focused on the United States. Initially, the bulk 
of empirical work followed mainly a case study approach. Case studies such as those 
from Brakel (1988), Urban Institute (1989), Logan (1992), Archambeault and Deis 
(1997), and Thomas (1997) suggested that privately managed prisons perform as well or 
better than publicly managed prisons on confinement quality. Moore’s (1998) review of 
the early privatization research argued that market pressures and the competition for 
contracts might explain this finding. However, these early case studies suffer from small 
sample size, poor data reliability and validity, and limited generalizeability (Gaes et al. 
1998; Perrone and Pratt 2003).  
A number of subsequent studies used large-N surveys to compare the quality of 
confinement in public and private prisons. Austin and Coventry (2001), drawing on a 
survey of 1565 US prisons in 1997, found that both kinds of prisons performed similarly 
across multiple dimensions of service quality, with two important exceptions: private 
facilities employed (up to fifteen per cent) fewer staff and the rate of violent assaults 
seemed to be significantly higher. Camp and Gaes (2002) suggested that privately 
operated prisons have higher staff turnover rates and “systemic problems in maintain 
secure facilities (2004, 244)”, when analysing a 1999 survey of administrators 
monitoring private prisons in the US. Armstrong and MacKenzie’s (2003) study of 48 
young offender institutions in 19 US states finds that any “differences in environmental 
quality between private and public juvenile correctional facilities are attributable to 
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characteristics other than operating sector (2003, 557).” Perrone and Pratt’s (2003) 
review of the case-study and survey-based evidence suggests that though private prisons 
seem to perform as well or better than public ones in terms of prison order and prisoner 
care, they perform equally well or worse in terms of prisoner safety. Lundahl et al’s 
(2009) subsequent review identified better facility conditions, staff working conditions 
and prisoner safety in private prisons, with publicly managed prisons performing better 
on security (number of escapes and visitors being harmed) and inmate grievances. 
With growing interest in prison privatization, much of the research on this topic 
has now shifted to regression based studies. Lukemeyer and McCorkle (2006) compared 
violent assaults in private, federal and state prisons, using the US 1995 Census of State 
and Federal Adult Correctional Facilities, finding that private and state facilities were 
less likely to experience violence than federal prisons. Makarios and Maahs (2012), 
drawing on the 2000 Census of State and Federal Adult Correctional Facilities, find 
that US private, state and federal prisons performed similarly across many dimensions 
of quality. However, private facilities were less overcrowded than federal and state 
prisons, while federal prisons do better in terms of work opportunities, treatment and 
education of prisoners. Nevertheless, these two US studies are both cross-sectional, and 
so do not adequately account for unobserved heterogeneity in the cases analyzed. By 
contrast, Cabral et al’s (2010; 2013) analysis of the performance of prisons in the 
Brazilian state of Paraná utilises panel regression techniques that can account for 
unobserved heterogeneity. This research finds that private prisons that are overseen by 
state-appointed wardens perform better on several dimensions of confinement quality.   
 
[Table 1 about here] 
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 The findings from all of the studies reviewed are summarised in Table 1. To 
organize those findings according to different dimensions of service quality we draw 
upon Logan’s (1992) eight dimensions of prison confinement quality: security, safety, 
order, care, activity, justice, conditions, and management. The evidence presented in the 
summary table is suggestive of the possibility that privately-managed prisons may do 
well on some dimensions of confinement quality rather than others. In particular, 
private prisons seem to perform better than public ones on dimensions of quality that 
are easier to measure, such as the conditions of confinement and the activities available 
for prisoners. Perhaps more surprisingly, they also seem to outperform public prisons on 
the more difficult to measure quality dimension of prison order. While these outcomes 
are, for the most part, largely in line with the theory of incomplete contracts advanced 
above, the methodological weaknesses of most of the existing studies mean that the 
findings from prior research should be treated with great caution. 
Firstly, few previous quantitative studies have utilised a research design that is 
able to fully account for unobserved heterogeneity within the data or long-run effects of 
contracting decisions. Panel regression techniques that can capture the effects of unit 
heterogeneity and within-variations in the dependent and independent variables offer the 
most effective method for identifying substantive statistical relationships. Yet only two 
studies (Cabral et al. 2010; 2013) adopt such a methodology for studying how 
privatization affects service quality in prisons, both of which are undertaken in the same 
organizational setting. Most of the previous research draws upon cross-sectional data, 
and much of it utilises only bivariate or descriptive statistics. In this study, we apply 
quantitative multivariate regression techniques to longitudinal data on prison service 
quality.  
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Secondly, most of the evidence on public and private differences in prison 
service quality originates from the Brazil and the United States, which may make it 
difficult to generalize the findings outside that context, particularly to the UK system 
where the contracts for private prisons are extremely detailed in comparison with those 
in other countries, covering multiple dimensions of service quality. In this respect, 
empirical evidence from an enthusiastic adopter of private prisons, but one that seeks to 
monitor contract performance very closely, would cast valuable new light on the 
generalizeability of the theory of incomplete contracts. 
 
DATA AND METHODS 
To explore variations in service quality across privately and publicly-managed prisons, 
we draw upon an unbalanced panel of English and Welsh prisons from the period 
1998/1999 to 2012/2013. There are 152 prisons in England and Wales of six main 
types: dispersals, training, local, open and semi-open prisons, and young offender 
institutions, of which sixteen were privately managed at some point of time during the 
study period. Each of the different types of prison reflects the criminal profile of the 
individuals who are held there. For example, dispersal prisons hold the most difficult 
and dangerous prisoners, known as Category A prisoners, closed training prisons, hold 
Category B and C prisoners – individuals for whom escape must be made very difficult, 
with local prisons being temporary holding stations and open prisons housing Category 
D prisoners – individuals considered to be low risk to the public. Table 1A in the 
Appendix provides full definitions of the different categories of prison, and the types of 
offences leading to prisoner categorisation can be found at: 
http://www.prisonersadvice.org.uk/DOCS/INFORMATION/CATEGORISATIONMale
.pdf).  
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For the purposes of our analysis, we include only those prisons that hold adult 
inmates who cannot be trusted in open conditions, namely dispersals, and male and 
female training prisons and local prisons in the statistical models. The final sample for 
our analysis thus consists of 114 prisons, of which fifteen were privately managed at 
some time during the study period. Data on the quality of the service provided by 
prisons in England and Wales and on relevant prison characteristics were taken from the 
Prison Performance Statistics database provided by the British Ministry of Justice 
(MOJ).  
 
Dependent variables 
Theories of public service performance emphasise the multiplicity and complexity of 
organizational goals in the public sector and the ways in which the measurement of 
these goals reflects the perspectives of different stakeholders (Walker et al. 2010). Aside 
from providing secure confinement facilities, English and Welsh prisons are typically 
required to meet a range of potentially conflicting goals, from safe and decent living 
accommodation to ‘purposeful activities’ for prisoners. The achievements of prisons in 
meeting these goals are judged by a diverse array of constituencies, such as taxpayers, 
advocacy groups and politicians, with the weighting, and interpretation of the available 
prison performance information all subject to ongoing debate and contestation amongst 
key stakeholders (see http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-23923321). The analysis presented 
here focuses on publicly available measures of service that are collected and published 
by the primary external stakeholder on the performance of English and Welsh prisons: 
UK central government.  
To assess the relative service quality in publicly versus privately managed 
prisons, we draw upon measures of five key dimensions of confinement quality. 
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Measuring the quality of confinement is not a simple task, since it may involve many 
different dimensions (Lundahl et al. 2009) and, it seems that there is no agreed way to 
conceptualise and operationalise it in the academic literature (Perrone and Pratt 2003). 
Following Perrone and Pratt (2003, 306), Logan’s (1992) approach seems to have 
become the most widely accepted among researchers when conceptualising service 
quality in prisons. Logan (1992) identifies eight dimensions of quality of confinement: 
security, safety, order, care, activity, justice, conditions, and management. Here, we 
focus on those dimensions of quality in English and Welsh prisons for which measures 
are publicly available, namely conditions, activity, security, order and safety.  
Prison conditions are evaluated by means of the overcrowding rate calculated as 
the share of prisoners held in a cell where the number of occupants exceeds the 
stipulated uncrowded capacity (i.e. two prisoners in a one person cell or three prisoners 
in a two person cell). This measure has been an important component of the 
performance management system for prisons in England and Wales since the 1980s 
when the Prison Service started to publish performance information in its annual reports 
(Boin et al. 2006). Overcrowding measures of this sort have been used frequently in 
prior studies of quality of confinement (see, for example, Makarios and Maahs 2012), 
giving us confidence that we are able to capture a relevant aspect of the conditions that 
prisoners experience. Nearly identical results for overcrowding to those presented below 
were observed when using a more tightly defined measure of “doubling”, or the 
percentage of one person cells occupied by two people in each establishment (available 
on request).  
We include a measure of the purposeful activity undertaken by prisoners, as an 
outcome variable that captures Logan’s (1992) dimension of confinement activity. This 
is measured as the average number of hours per week per prisoner spent engaged in 
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activities, such as educational classes, offender behaviour programmes, vocational 
training, and production workshops. Again, measures similar to this have been used in 
prior research examining public-private differences in the quality of confinement in 
prisons.   
Security is measured as the total number of escapes from each institution per 
year; again, a measure that has been used in other studies of prison service quality. 
More specifically, escapes are defined in the prison service performance management 
framework as incidents where a prisoner is not recaptured within 15 minutes, or is 
recaptured earlier but not before committing a further offence. The indicator does not 
include prisoners who abscond without having to overcome any physical security 
restraints or the presence of a guarding officer (Solomon 2004). 
To assess Logan’s (1992) prison order dimension, we employ the rate of random 
positive Mandatory Drug Tests (MDT), which serves as a proxy for drug misuse and its 
associated implications within prisons. MDTs were introduced for all prisons in 
England and Wales in 1996, and are carried out by the Drug Strategy Unit of the Prison 
Service. MDTs have three main aims: i) to deter the use of drugs; ii) to identify 
prisoners to treat and prisoners to punish; and, iii) to provide information on the level 
and type of drug use within a prison. All prisons are required to randomly test 5–10% of 
their population each month, with urine samples being sent to a central laboratory for 
testing. A positive drug result may result in an automatic loss of remission and 
privileges (McDonald 1997). 
Finally, the number of serious assaults each year within each prison is used to 
evaluate the safety dimension of service quality. This measure is again an integral part 
of the performance management system for prisons in England and Wales, and is 
collected with a view to gauging how safe inmates are likely to feel within confinement 
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(Solomon 2004). In this respect, it largely reflects the skill with which prison officers 
are able to deal with and manage the challenging interpersonal relationships that evolve 
within prisons (Bottoms 1999). The rate of assaults is another indicator that has been 
used in several previous studies investigating prison performance (e.g. Archambeault 
and Deis 1997; Lukemeyer and McCorkle 2006).  
As noted above, all of these measures of service quality are ones that matter to 
external stakeholders, especially the National Offender Management Service, the 
regulatory agency responsible for collecting this data and using it to determine annual 
prison performance ratings. They are also used by nonprofit prison reform advocacy 
groups, such as the Prison Reform Trust and the Howard League for Penal Reform to 
campaign for prisoners’ rights, and frequently “hit the headlines” in the UK national 
media (e.g. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-28582622; http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-
23923321; http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-south-yorkshire-28760630). 
Because measures like these have been used in several previous studies and because 
they are important to external stakeholders, we believe that our dependent variables 
have a high degree of face validity as proxies for the service quality in prisons in 
England and Wales. 
 
Independent variables 
The primary independent variable of interest is prison management type; a dummy 
variable is included in the model to capture whether each prison is privately or publicly 
managed (private=1; public=0). This approach is used in nearly all regression-based 
analyses of contracting out and public service quality (see Andrews et al. 2011a). 
Ideally, it would be important to evaluate whether selection into management type 
occurred on the basis of prior performance (or other relevant prison characteristics). 
19 
 
However, since only two prisons switched management type during the period under 
study, our ability to address selection effects is somewhat limited. Moreover, all 
privately managed prisons are newly built facilities, so there is no information on past 
performance, and those prisons that were subsequently returned to public management 
did so as a result of a competitive bidding process based on costs rather than quality 
(Panchamia and Gash 2012). To ensure that our models are well-specified, nevertheless, 
we include a set of control variables which may affect prison quality, as identified by 
previous research: prison size, prisoner profile and the degree of overcrowding in the 
models predicting the other four dimensions of service quality (see, for example, 
Perrone and Pratt 2003; Lukemeyer and McCorkle 2006; Makarios and Maahs 2012).  
Prison size is measured as the annual average number of prisoners residing 
within an institution. Although large prisons may benefit from economies of scale, it 
seems likely that they will experience greater problems providing high quality 
confinement than smaller ones due to dislocation effects and the challenges of managing 
a big and diverse prisoner population. For example, following the 25-day riot at 
Strangeways prison in Manchester in 1990, the Woolf Report recommended that prison 
size be restricted for these very reasons.  
The risk to the public (and to other prisoners and prison staff) that prisoners pose 
may influence the ability of institutions to provide a quality service. Prisoner profile is 
operationalized here by including a series of dummy variables that capture the security 
level of the prison in which individuals are confined (see Table 1A in the Appendix). 
Thus, dichotomous variable are constructed for dispersal prisons, male training, female 
training, and female local prisons, with male local prisons as the reference group (coded 
0 in each dummy). The coefficients for the prison category variables indicate 
differences between the included groups and the reference group.  
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Finally, the level of overcrowding is also included as a control variable since it is 
an important potential determinant of other dimensions of confinement quality. 
Overcrowding has been shown to be related to higher levels of violence in prisons in 
previous studies, for example (e.g., Gaes and McGuire 1985). Again, we measure 
overcrowding as the percentage of inmates who are kept in a cell where the number of 
occupants surpass the uncrowded capacity. Descriptive statistics for all the variables 
included in the models are shown in Table 2. 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
  
Econometric specification 
In order to test whether the quality of the service provided by public and private prisons 
in England and Wales differs, we estimate five different panel regression models 
predicting each dependent variable. Empirically, a panel-based approach is more 
adequate than a cross-section analysis because, among other reasons, omitted variables 
or unobserved prison characteristics for which annual data are unavailable (such as the 
number, training, and ability of prison officers) can be modelled by including a prison 
individual effect. Therefore, the baseline model specification is the following: 
 
(1) ݕ�� = �ݔ�� + �′��� + �� + �� + ��� 
 
where y��  is a measure of one of the four dimensions of confinement quality in prison i 
at time t; x�� is the itth observation of the private management dummy; Zit the itth 
observation on P control variables; T is a time trend;  �� denotes prison unit-effects; and ��� the remainder disturbance term. To test the proposed hypotheses about public-
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private differences in service quality, the coefficient of interest is β in each of the five 
regression models.  
A widely used approach when estimating models such as equation (1) has been 
the fixed effects (FE) estimator. For the purpose of our analysis, the main weakness 
with the FE approach is that time invariant variables cannot be estimated. This is an 
important concern in our study, because we need to account for the influence of prisoner 
profile on the quality the service provided in public and private prisons. From this 
perspective, using a random effects (RE) estimator may be preferable since it permits 
the estimation of time invariant variables. However, the RE model makes the strong 
assumption that all explanatory variables are uncorrelated with the individual effect, 
whereas the FE model allows all the explanatory variables to be correlated with the 
individual specific effect (��). Unfortunately, then, the RE estimator is often biased and 
inconsistent because some explanatory variables in a regression analysis are correlated 
with the individual effect (Baltagi 2013).  
An alternative to the kind of “all or nothing” situation posed by the choice 
between FE and RE estimation is the Hausman and Taylor (1981) (HT) estimator, 
which can estimate time invariant covariates and allow some explanatory variables to be 
correlated with the individual effect. The HT procedure is an instrumental variable 
approach that uses the model information to instrument the endogenous variables. More 
specifically, Hausman and Taylor (1981) considered four groups of variables: time 
varying variables uncorrelated with the individual effect; time varying variables 
correlated with the individual effect; time invariant variables uncorrelated with the 
individual effect; and, time invariant variables correlated with the individual effect. In 
this model, the endogenous time varying variables are instrumented by the deviations 
from their own means and, the endogenous time invariant variables are instrumented by 
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the individual means of the exogenous explanatory variables (for a comprehensive view 
of the FE, RE and HT estimators, see Baltagi 2013).   
In order to test which of the three panel estimators is preferable, Baltagi et al. 
(2003) suggest a pretest estimator based on the traditional Hausman test. Following 
Baltagi et al. (2003, 362), the pretest estimator reverts to the RE estimator if the 
Hausman test of no difference between FE and RE estimates is not rejected.  If the first 
Hausman test rejects the null hypothesis of no misspecification, the pretest estimator 
then reverts to the HT estimator if a second Hausman test of no difference between FE 
and HT is not rejected. Otherwise, i.e. when both Hausman tests reject the null 
hypothesis, the pretest estimator takes the form of the FE estimator. A major concern 
here might be the presence of heteroscedasticity in the data since the Hausman test 
statistic is not appropriate in that case (Wooldridge 2010; Baltagi 2013), and which may 
lead to an erroneous choice of the estimation method.  To overcome this potential 
problem we compute the robust version of the Hausman test proposed by Schaffer and 
Stillman (2011). 
Finally, it is important to address the issue of potential endogeneity occurring 
through the error terms, i.e. the correlation between the explanatory variable of interest 
and the disturbances. This could arise if some of the observed and unobserved factors 
that influence quality outcomes also influence selection into public or private 
management. In our context, this endogeneity issue would be ideally addressed using 
dynamic Arellano and Bond’s (1991) estimators, which instrument for selection effects 
using suitable lags of the potential endogenous variables in differenced form. However, 
the lack of variation in private management during the study period limits our ability to 
adopt this approach. Nonetheless, we tested whether the potentially endogenous 
regressors (i.e., the type of management) can be actually treated as exogenous. To do so, 
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we ran the endogeneity tests described in Baum et al. (2007) after a two-stage least 
squares specification, using the first and second lags of the management model as 
instruments.  For all cases, we could not reject the null hypothesis that a non-
instrumental estimator of the same equation would yield consistent estimates. Hence, 
we feel confident that, within the constraints posed by our dataset, the estimates that we 
present below are not unduly affected by endogeneity. 
 
RESULTS 
Tables 3 and 4 present Hausman-Taylor (HT) and random effects (RE) estimates for the 
proposed regression models, starting with prison conditions, activities and order in 
Table 3, before moving on to prison safety and security in Table 4. The conventional 
Hausman test and the robust version, point to the HT estimator when predicting prison 
overcrowding and drugs misuse. As regards the regression model predicting serious 
assaults, the estimator choice is unclear: though both tests point to the RE estimator at a 
5 per cent significance level, the robust version points to the HT estimator if we set the 
significance level up to a 10 percent (p-value=0.066). On the other hand, both tests 
point to the RE estimator when predicting the number of escapes (see Tables 3 and 4). 
Hence, although we present estimation results for both the RE and HT estimators, we 
discuss only those results related to the preferred estimator for each regression model, 
excepting the serious assaults model where we compare the RE and HT results.  
Diagnostic tests revealed that the data may suffer from heteroscedasticity. To 
overcome this problem we compute heteroscedasticity robust standard errors.1 By 
contrast, multicollinearity does not seem to be a concern for our analysis since the 
individual Variance Inflation Factor is well below 2.5 for all explanatory variables 
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(Belsley et al. 1980), and, furthermore, the correlations between all of the variables 
included in our analysis are all below 0.4 (see Table 2A in the Appendix). 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
Starting with the analysis of the conditions variable, it appears that privately 
managed prisons seem to experience less overcrowding than public ones: the coefficient 
for the private management dummy variable is negative and statistically significant. 
This mirrors the results of previous studies showing that prison conditions may be better 
in privately-managed establishments.  Among the control variables, establishment size 
and some categories of prisons are significantly related to the level of overcrowding. As 
expected, prison population is positively related to overcrowding, while it seems that 
dispersals and female training prisons are significantly less overcrowded than male 
training and local prisons. The time trend has a positive and significant coefficient, 
suggesting that the level of overcrowding has risen among English and Welsh prisons 
over the last decade. 
Turning our attention to the activity dimension, the results suggest that inmates 
held in privately managed prisons enjoy more weekly hours of purposeful activity than 
those confined in public facilities. Among the control variables, prison population and, 
especially, dispersal prisons, are negatively related to hours of activity. The latter result 
is quite interesting, since it suggests that a trade-off between security and hours of 
activity may exist in high security prisons, a concern recently expressed by the HM 
Inspectorate of Prisons (https://www.justice.gov.uk/news/press-releases/hmi-
prisons/hmp-belmarsh-too-much-security,-too-little-purposeful-activity). The time trend 
25 
 
coefficient is positive (and significant) suggesting that the weekly number of hours 
dedicated to purposeful activity has risen, on average, during the period under study.   
The regression models indicate that the private management dummy variable is 
not an important determinant of prison security, implying that publicly and privately 
managed prisons report similar levels of prisoner escapes. Hence, our analysis suggests 
that there may be something common to how public and private prisons deal with 
security that generates similar levels of escaping. Dispersals and female training prisons 
appear to report fewer escapes, and whilst prison size and overcrowding rates show 
significant z-statistics, their coefficients are close to zero.  The results also show a 
negative time trend, suggesting a security improvement in English and Welsh prisons 
over the last decade. 
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
In contrast, when looking at the prison order and safety, we clearly see that 
confinement quality appears to be worse in private than publicly-run prisons. Privately 
managed prisons experience higher rates of drugs misuse and a higher number of 
serious assaults: the coefficient for private management is positive and statistically 
significant in both models.2 Among the control variables, prison size and prison 
category again seem to be relevant factors when explaining quality. Prison population is 
positively related to both rate of drugs misuse and number of serious assaults. 
Nevertheless, the results suggest that prison category is not a significant factor when 
explaining drugs misuse. On the other hand, male and female training prisons and local 
female prisons appear less likely to experience violence than dispersals and male local 
prisons when analysing the RE estimator results, but not with the HT model, where 
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prison category is not significant. As pointed out previously, the estimator choice in the 
model explaining assaults is unclear, so results regarding the influence of prison 
category on violence should be interpreted with caution. The time trend coefficient is 
only statistically significant (and negative) in the model explaining drugs misuse, 
suggesting that this dimension of service quality improved, on average, during the study 
period. 
 
DISCUSSION 
In general, our results support our hypotheses that privatization will be positively 
related to easy-to-measure dimensions of public service quality, and vice versa. 
Privatization appears to be associated with better prison conditions and activities, but 
worse prison order and safety. In particular, the findings for prison overcrowding 
suggest that private prisons may offer better quality confinement in some important 
respects than their publicly-managed counterparts. The theory of incomplete contracts 
provides a fruitful lens for understanding why standards for some dimensions of quality 
may be more easily specified than others. This may be especially important in the case 
of English and Welsh prisons where the nature of the contracts between the UK 
government and private prison contractors can illustrate why privatization may have 
varying results for the different dimensions of confinement quality. At the same time, 
the differential (and shared) capabilities of private and public organizations may also 
provide further insight into the findings that we uncover. 
Although UK prison contracts are not made publicly available, how the contracts 
are drafted is discussed in audit reports and qualitative research on prison management 
(Bastow 2013; NAO 2003). There are two common characteristics of the contracts, 
which may influence prison service quality: firstly, the payment mechanism; and, 
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secondly, the payment deduction system.  Private contractors are paid in terms of the 
number of prisoner places available, not by the allocated number of prisoners. Contracts 
also specify the number of prisoners to accommodate and/or “acceptable” overcrowding 
rates.3 Critically, due to the contract specification, private contractors may refuse point 
blank to take in additional prisoners, unlike public prison managers who have to 
negotiate with central government over the allocation of further prisoners. As a result, 
private contractors have a strong profit-maximization incentive to reduce overcrowding 
rates, especially as they may get financial deductions for unauthorized overcrowding 
(Bastow 2013, 214). A similar explanation may hold in the case of prisoner activity, 
with contracts for private prisons specifying higher targets for activity compared with 
the targets for public prisons (NAO 2003). At the same time, private firms are typically 
able to access and utilise new technological developments more quickly than their 
public sector counterparts (Osborne and Gaebler 1992), and so have stronger capability 
in those areas where technological innovation matters more. In fact, private prisons in 
England and Wales have been shown to innovate in the design and management of 
prison facilities and prisoner activities in just this way; case-based studies have shown 
that in privately operated prisons, innovative solutions in prison design and operation 
have been incorporated that had not been implemented previously (NAO 1997; 2003).  
A further potential reason for private prisons to focus attention on conditions and 
activity is the reputational benefits that might accrue as a result of doing so. 
Stewardship theory suggests that relational reciprocity is a more important influence on 
the behaviour of contractors than profit-maximization (Davis et al. 1997). By 
demonstrating that they are trustworthy to government, private firms providing public 
services can enhance their reputation as “stewards” that share the same goals as their 
principals. This, in turn, may help with future contract negotiations. Hence, private 
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firms are likely to regard good performance on easier-to-measure dimensions of service 
quality as a valuable and inexpensive means for gaining reputational benefits that can 
reduce the transaction costs associated with meeting monitoring requirements. This is 
something that may be especially likely for levels of overcrowding in private prisons, 
because the main stakeholders in the UK prison system continue to regard 
overcrowding as the key performance indicator by which prisons’ achievements should 
be judged.  
Despite the appearance of a positive privatization performance pay-off for prison 
conditions and activity, it seems that there is a performance penalty for the less easily-
measured and managed dimensions of prison order and safety. The contracts signed by 
private prisons can again illustrate why this may be so. UK prison contracts aim to 
circumvent performance erosion, and payment deductions can be made if a contractor 
fails to achieve certain quality standards. In particular, fixed-penalty deductions can be 
made for very serious incidents, such as an escape. This can also occur when a 
contractor exceeds an agreed number of penalty points for poor performance on a range 
of other key performance measures relating to prison order and safety (NAO 2003, 13).  
However, if the penalty points accrued do not exceed the baseline number there is no 
deduction made, indicating that there is little incentive to provide more than the 
minimum standard on some dimensions of service quality. Or put differently, there is 
presently no reward for providing excellent levels of prison order and safety. At the 
same time, it is quite conceivable that public prisons have longer experience of, and 
better qualified staff able to deal with, the complex social relationships that underly the 
development of a well-ordered prison. In this sense, better performance on hard-to-
measure dimensions of service may reflect the distinctive capabilities or comparative 
sectoral advantage of public organizations. 
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In terms of escapes, the use of a fixed penalty provides the strong incentive 
required to ensure that private contractors work as hard as public prisons to prevent 
inmates escaping. By contrast, less grievous incidents, such as drugs misuse or violent 
assaults, play a relatively small part in the performance point system, and so private 
managers may have little incentive to go beyond the bare minimum for these quality 
dimensions. In fact, it has been found that “under certain circumstances, these charges 
(penalty payment deductions) may be waived”4 through negotiations between the Prison 
Service and the private contractors. Nevertheless, the results for prison escapes may also 
indicate that the seriousness of this organizational goal means that both public and 
private prison service providers must develop some core capabilities or competences in 
order to meet the bare minimum standards of confinement quality. 
In sum, our findings illustrate that not only are there few incentives for private 
contractors to perform well on harder-to-measure quality dimensions, and that 
government may be content to accept that there are difficulties in monitoring the 
capabilities of private organizations in such areas. Hence, it seems that profit 
maximization incentives, organizational capabilities, reputational benefits and output 
measurability might help to explain our findings regarding prison service quality in 
England and Wales.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we have analysed variations in public service quality attributable to the 
private management of prisons and assessed whether output measurability, incentives 
and capabilities are important factors in shaping the effects of privatization. Overall, our 
results seem to support our hypothesis that the privatization of prison services may lead 
to service improvement for easy-to-measure dimensions of service quality. On those 
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dimensions where the contracts give very little incentive to private contractors to reduce 
costs and that may even represent an area of comparative sectoral advantage for them, 
i.e., conditions and activities, we find no quality deterioration issues as a result of 
privatization. On the other hand, the findings for prison order and safety imply that it 
has not been possible to specify the contractually-agreed performance point system in 
such a way as to circumvent the incentive for private contractors to allow service quality 
to deteriorate. They also suggest that the capabilities of public organizations may be 
superior for delivering good performance on such hard-to-measure and manage 
dimensions of service quality. Despite these apparent sectoral differences, the results for 
prison escapes are suggestive of the possibility that for the most critical dimensions of 
service quality, public and private organizations may share some core capabilities and 
competences. These findings have important theoretical and practical implications. 
 Previous studies of prison privatization have provided mixed evidence of its 
effects on service quality. However, these studies have been almost exclusively 
concerned with the US penal system, and have largely relied on bivariate or descriptive 
statistics or under-specified multivariate regression models. In this paper, we have 
presented an analysis of private versus public-managed prisons in England and Wales 
that utilises a longitudinal data set, permitting the application of panel regression 
techniques, which can deal with omitted variable bias and unobserved heterogeneity. 
Our findings point towards the variability of private prison performance, which some 
prior research has also identified. In particular, the results suggest that contract 
specification and organizational capabilities may have a critical role to play in 
determining the quality of confinement offered in privately-run prisons, with harder to 
specify dimensions of service quality appearing to suffer most when prisons are 
privatized. As such, the study offers support for the theory of incomplete contracts 
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advanced by Hart et al. (1997), and tends to confirm the argument advanced in that 
paper that output measurability matters for the performance of privatised public 
services. In the case of English and Welsh prisons, the development of a sophisticated 
and complex penalty point system for hard-to-specify dimensions of service quality 
does not appear to have resulted in quality improvements. Given the apparent 
persistence of distinctive sectoral capabilities, it may not be efficient or effective to 
devote considerable effort to redesigning contracting frameworks to improve 
performance on hard-to-measure dimensions of service quality. 
 Despite the strengths of the findings and our study design, there are several 
limitations of our analysis that offer opportunities for further research. Firstly, the 
dependent variables used in our analysis capture only five of the eight dimensions of 
prison service quality identified by Logan (2002). Subsequent studies could analyse the 
relationship between privatization and care, justice, and management within prisons. 
The development of reliable indicators of each of these dimensions of confinement 
quality would therefore be of immense value, as would the construction of additional 
indicators of those dimensions we already capture. Secondly, we discuss the role of 
incomplete contracts as an explanatory factor in some detail. Yet, there are other aspects 
of private versus public management of prisons that we are unable to garner reliable 
information, such as the number and quality of prison officers in different institutions. 
Moreover, data capturing the distinctive (and shared) capabilities of private and public 
organizations would enable the role of comparative sectoral advantage to be explored in 
full. In particular, it is conceivable that the positive relationship between public 
management and prison order and safety is attributable to the public service motivation 
and ethos of publicly employed prison officers (see Koumenta 2011). The use of panel 
regression models provides some reassurance that we have accounted for individual 
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institution effects, but longitudinal research that could draw upon measures of non-
contractible factors and capabilities would undoubtedly cast considerable further light 
on the relationships we identify here. As indeed would detailed qualitative research and 
case study work comparing the ways in which public and private prisons are managed 
in England and Wales.  
Finally, our research is restricted to publicly and privately-managed prisons in a 
single national context. Evidence on prison service quality from settings other than the 
UK, the US and Brazil, and from systematic comparative studies, would prove 
invaluable in moving theoretical and empirical understanding of privatization forward. 
In particular, it is quite possible that the results would be quite different in contexts in 
which the service delivery contracts did not incorporate such a diverse range of 
potentially conflicting dimensions of service quality. For now, though, we can conclude 
that our study highlights that the theory of incomplete contracts allied to the concepts of 
output measurability and offers an especially useful framework for analysing the effects 
of privatization. Our findings also suggest that policy-makers should think very 
carefully about the limits of contract specification and organizational capabilities when 
considering the involvement of the private sector in the provision of public services.   
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NOTES 
1. To compute the robust standard errors for the HT estimator, we have modified the 
STATA command xthtaylor to allow for heteroscedasticity robust standard errors.  The 
.ado file can be provided on request. Identical results can be obtained by using the 
STATA user written command xtoverid (Schaffer and Stillman 2011) with the option 
robust, after xthtaylor. 
2. In the case of the serious assaults model, the pretest estimator points to the discussed 
RE model only at a 5 percent significance level, thus the estimator choice is not clear.  
However, both estimators, namely RE and HT, report almost the same results for our 
main variable of interest. 
3. Early contracts included the number of prisoners to accommodate, while more recent 
contracts include thresholds of crowding rates from the outset and capacity increments 
can be activated from the existing contracts at pre-specified prices and, unlike earlier 
contracts, with no additional contract renegotiations.  
4. Hansard (Commons), 19 October 2012, column 496W. 
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TABLE 1 
Studies of privatization and public service quality in prisons 
Study Country 
/Sample 
Security Safety Order Care Activity Justice Conditions Management 
Brakel 1989 USA/1 Inconclusive Inconclusive - No differences Mixed  Mixed Private Private 
Urban Institute 1989 USA/6 Private Private - - Public - Private No difference 
Logan 1992 USA/3 Private Private Private Public Private No 
difference 
Private Private 
Archambeault and 
Deis 1996 
USA/3 Public Private Private - Private Private - Inconclusive 
Thomas 1997 USA/16 Private Private Private - Inconclusive Private - - 
Austin and Coventry 
2001 
USA/1565 - Public - - Equal/Private - - - 
Camp and Gaes 2002 USA/91 Public Inconclusive Public - - - - Public 
Armstrong and 
MacKenzie 2003 
USA/48 - No difference - - No difference No 
difference 
No difference - 
Perrone and Prat 2003 USA/9* Inconclusive Equal/Public Equal/Private Equal/Private Inconclusive - Inconclusive Inconclusive 
Lukemeyer and 
McCorkle 2003 
USA/873 - Private - - Private - - - 
Lundahl et al. 2009 USA/12* Public Private - No difference No difference Public Private Private 
Cabral et al. 2010 Brazil/13 Private 
(hybrid) 
No difference - Private 
(hybrid) 
- No 
difference 
- - 
Makarios and Maahs 
2012 
USA/1129 No difference No difference No differences No difference Public - Private No difference 
Cabral et al. 2013 Brazil/19 Private 
(hybrid) 
Private 
(hybrid) 
- No difference - No 
difference 
- - 
Notes: Quality domains adapted by the authors to fit Logan’s (1992) quality of confinement model. *Number of studies included in the  meta-analysis. - = not analyzed.  
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TABLE 2 
Variable definitions and descriptive statistics 
Variable         Definition Mean SD VIF 
Overcrowding Percentage of prisoners who are held in a cell, 
where the number of occupants exceeds the 
uncrowded capacity of the cell. 
23.63 26.82 1.86 
Activity Number of hours per week per prisoner spent 
engaged in activities, such as educational 
classes, offender behaviour programmes, 
vocational training, and production workshops 
23.97 6.16  
Escapes Total number of escapes 0.11 0.44  
Positive MDT Rate of positive drug tests under the random 
MDT programme 
10.54
  
7.08  
Serious assaults Number of incidents in which at least one 
victim sustained a serious injury as a result of 
offences against the person.  
10.04 8.75  
Private Dummy variable which takes value 1 if the 
prison if privately managed. 
0.09 0.28 1.05 
Size Average annual prison population 624.93 308.42 1.39 
Dispersals See table 1A 0.05 0.21 1.44 
Male Training See table 1A 0.51 0.50 2.31 
Female Training See table 1A 0.03 0.18 1.49 
Female local See table 1A 0.07 0.25 1.65 
Notes: Some variables’ definitions are based on, National Offender Management Service (2010). SD refers to the 
standard deviation. VIF refers to the variance inflation factor 
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TABLE 3 
Determinants of prison conditions, activity and security in England and Wales (1998-2012) 
 
 Overcrowding rate Purposeful Activity Escapes 
HT&a RE HT&b RE HTa RE& 
Coef. SE. Coef. SE Coef. SE. Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE 
Private -6.066** 2.423 -6.553** 2.833 2.052* 1.115 2.807*** 1.036 -0.006 0.053 -0.009 0.038 
Size 0.016*** 0.004 0.013** 0.006 -0.003*** 0.001 -0.003** 0.001 0.000* 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 
Overcrowding     0.005 0.010 -0.003 0.015 0.000 0.001 -0.001** 0.000 
Dispersals -27.806*** 5.012 -35.237*** 4.346 -4.516*** 1.615 -2.97** 1.207 0.099 0.249 -0.097*** 0.031 
Male training -4.925 3.096 -16.247*** 5.683 0.168 0.783 2.910** 1.281 0.072 0.061 0.005 0.032 
Female training -6.880** 3.341 -19.352*** 6.268 0.357 1.153 3.246** 1.508 0.019 0.069 -0.073** 0.034 
Female local -15.088 9.212 -23.494*** 5.894 -1.529 2.113 -0.161 1.404 0.154 0.110 0.070 0.064 
Time trend 0.300*** 0.073 0.370*** 0.122 0.147*** 0.025 0.153*** 0.045 -0.021*** 0.003 -0.020*** 0.004 
Observations 1524  1524  1314  1314  1524  1524  
Groups 114  114  109  109  114  114  
Wald-Chi2 170.88  150.47  55.75  76.79  64.16  70.23  
Hausman stat. 0.19  65.23***  4.51  29.09***  2.12  3.79  
Sargan-Hansen 
stat. 
0.32  61.79***  5.45  40.37***  5.72  10.45  
Notes: & Preferred estimator. (a) Endogenous covariates: Size, Private, Dispersal and Female training. (b) Endogenous covariates: Size, Overcrowding, Male training. (c) Endogenous 
covariates: Size, Private, Male and Female training. The selection is based on Hausman and overidentification tests (Sargan-J-Hansen statistic). The asterisks ***,**, and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively 
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TABLE 4 
Determinants of prison order and safety in England and Wales (1998-2012) 
 
 Positive MDTs Serious assaults 
HT&c RE HTa RE& 
Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE 
Private 7.975*** 2.469 1.938 1.350 9.571** 2.468 8.188*** 2.157 
Size 0.003* 0.002 0.003** 0.001 0.007** 0.003 0.012*** 0.002 
Overcrowding 0.012 0.020 0.013 0.021 0.010 0.032 -0.004 0.023 
Dispersals -9.455 6.562 -6.877*** 1.561 5.511 9.858 -0.511 2.455 
Male Training -1.576 1.401 -2.354*** 1.205 -3.626 2.533 -3.715*** 1.447 
Female Training -1.050 2.457 -3.303** 2.952 -5.671 3.188 -5.482*** 1.779 
Female local -1.677 2.530 -2.061 1.716 -4.800 3.630 -3.664** 1.839 
Time trend -0.771*** 0.041 -0.772*** 0.062 0.069 0.080 -0.010 0.107 
Observations 1523  1523  824  824  
Groups 114  114  107  107  
Wald-Chi2 529.26  224.51  82.66  190.06  
Hausman stat. 2.91  19.68***  -0.16  -2.49.  
Sargan-Hansen 
stat. 
2.37  15.88***  2.31  8.80*  
Notes: & Preferred estimator. (a) Endogenous covariates: Size and Dispersals. The selection is based on Hausman and 
overidentification tests (Sargan-J-Hansen statistic). The asterisks ***,**, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively 
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APPENDIX A. SUPPLEMENTARY TABLES 
TABLE 1A 
Definitions of prison functions 
Type of prison Prison function 
Dispersal These prisons hold the most difficult and dangerous prisoners in England and Wales including 
those assessed as Category A.  They serve to spread the Category A population, ensuring that the 
most dangerous prisoners are not concentrated in a single establishment, thereby reducing the 
risks involved in holding them. 
Male training 
Female training 
Closed training prisons provide a range of facilities for Category B and Category C adult male 
prisoners and closed condition adult females who are serving medium to long-term sentences.  
Prisoners tend to be employed in a variety of activities such as prison workshops, gardens and 
education and in offending behaviour programmes. 
Female local                  
Male local 
Local prisons serve the courts and receive remand and post conviction prisoners, prior to their 
allocation to other establishments.  
Female open                  
Male open 
Open prisons house Category D adult male prisoners and Open condition adult females whose 
risk of absconding is considered to be low, or who are of little risk to the public because of the 
nature of their offence.  Open prisons also house long-term prisoners who are coming towards the 
end of their sentence and who have gradually worked their way down the categories.  Open 
prisons are part of the resettlement programme to reintegrate prisoners back into society.  Whilst 
Open prisons may have some workshop facilities, some of the prisoners will work in the 
community, returning to the prison in the evening. 
Male closed YOI           
(ages 15-21) 
Young Offender Institutions (YOIs) holding Young Adults (18 to 21 years old). May also include 
young people (aged 15 to 17) who are held separately from adults within the establishment. 
Male YOI young 
people          (ages 
15-17) 
Young Offender Institutions (YOIs) holding Young People (15 to 17 years old). 
Male open YOI Open YOI prisons house young adult prisoners whose risk of absconding is considered to be low, 
or who are of little risk to the public because of the nature of their offence.  
Cluster Cluster prisons may contain a number of prisons with different functions.  
Source: National Offender Management Service (2013) Costs per place and costs per prisoner Annual Report and Accounts 2012-13 
Management Information Addendum, London: Ministry of Justice. 
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TABLE 2A 
Pairwise correlation matrix of independent variables 
 Private Size Overcrowding Dispersals 
Male 
training 
Female 
training 
Female 
local 
Private 1.000       
 
       
Size 0.185 1.000      
 (0.000)       
Overcrowding 0.026 0.179 1.000     
 (0.316) (0.000)      
Dispersals -0.068 -0.044 -0.200 1.000    
 (0.006) (0.084) (0.000)     
Male training -0.082 -0.159 -0.399 -0.222 1.000   
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
Female training -0.058 -0.243 -0.165 -0.041 -0.191 1.000  
 (0.019) (0.000) (0.000) (0.095) (0.000)   
Female local -0.007 -0.259 -0.151 -0.060 -0.276 -0.051 1.000 
 (0.783) (0.000) (0.000) (0.016) (0.000) (0.038)  
Notes: P-values reported in parentheses. 
 
